The Swine Flu Episode and the Fog of Epidemics1 by Krause, Richard
The 1918 influenza pandemic has shaped research
and public health for nearly a century. In 1976, the specter
of 1918 loomed large when a pandemic threatened the
country again. Public health officials initiated a mass vacci-
nation campaign, but the anticipated pandemic failed to
occur. An examination of the available data in 1976 and the
decision to vaccinate, as well as lessons learned from the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in the early 1980s, may help shape an
appropriate public health response to future threats from
avian influenza or other infectious diseases.
“Maye it please your Honor immediately upon the
Queen’s arrival here, she fell acquainted with a new dis-
ease that is common in this town, called here the Newe
Acquayantance, which passed also throughe her whole
Courte, neither sparing lordes, ladies nor damoysells, not
so much as either Frenche or English… There was no
appearance of danger, nor manie that die of the disease,
excepte some olde folks. I am ashamed to say that I have
byne free of it, seeing it seketh acquayantance at all man’s
handes.”
—Written in a letter in 1562 by Sir Thomas Randolph,
ambassador from Queen Elizabeth I to the court of 
Mary, Queen of Scots, Edinburgh, to Cecil in London (1). 
I read the 1953 lecture on Influenza: the Newe
Acquayantance (1) by Thomas Francis, Jr, in 1953, and I
did not read it again until recently, as I was preparing this
article. On reflection, I wish I had reread it during the
swine flu episode in 1976. Certainly Francis’s lecture, and
his conclusions and speculations about the mysteries of
1918 influenza, should temper our strategies for coping
with a possible human pandemic arising, like a phoenix,
from the current influenza epidemic in Asian chickens.
In light of an influenza outbreak at Fort Dix, New
Jersey, in February of 1976, the Public Health Service
decided to prepare an influenza vaccine with the Fort Dix
strain and immunize a large segment of the US population.
Mass immunization was achieved by October of that year,
although the predicted pandemic never occurred.
Now, 30 years later, we are faced with the threat of an
influenza pandemic that might emerge from a massive out-
break of avian influenza H5N1 in Asian chickens. Many
scientists and public health professionals who must now
make decisions about the public health response are not
virologists or influenza experts, as I was not, and they will
need to base their decisions on expert opinion and their
own evaluation of the facts. In 1976, I supported the deci-
sion to begin mass immunization, and this article examines
the data and experiences that contributed to that decision.
I hope my reflections will be useful for those who must
determine the public health response to the threat of H5N1
in 2005. They have my best wishes.
Early Experiences with Influenza
At the beginning of the 20th century, the fact that many
contagious diseases were caused by microbes was well
established, but at the time no treatment was available for
any of them except syphilis and malaria. Anxiety and
alarm were widespread among those who lived through the
devastating 1918 influenza pandemic about the potential
for a recurrence. In 1918, my parents and my brothers,
then children, were living in a small town in southeastern
Ohio. When I was a teenager in the 1930s, I recall my
mother’s reflections on the influenza pandemic. Our home
at the time was near a chair factory, and after work many
of the employees walked past our house. Occasionally, a
worker would spit phlegm or tobacco on the pavement. For
such occurrences, my mother always had a kettle of boil-
ing water ready, so she could immediately scald the
“damned spot,” hoping to kill the unseen germs and pro-
tect my brothers from influenza.
I relate this anecdote as a reminder that as recently as
the 1930s, when I was a teenager, the 1918 pandemic was
a living memory. To this day, that pandemic casts the
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My next experience with influenza was in 1944, when
I was in the US Army. The influenza vaccine had just been
developed by Francis, Jonas Salk, and others. Their work
had been supported by the army under the auspices of the
Armed Forces Epidemiology Board (AFEB), for whom the
pandemic of 1918 was still fresh: 50,000 soldiers had died
of influenza. We GIs were lined up at the dispensary and
given the vaccine, one soldier after another, with the same
50-mL syringe.
To this day, I recall the moderately severe local reac-
tion, swelling, considerable tenderness, and pain at the
injection site, and many soldiers had systemic reactions. I
remember that the vaccine in the syringe was turbid, but
did not know at the time that it had been grown in eggs. I
have wondered since then if the turbidity of the vaccine
was due to a residue of chicken feathers! Clearly, purifica-
tion had a long way to go in 1944.
Swine Flu
From 1970 to 1974, I was a member of the National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID)
Infectious Disease Advisory Committee. Several times a
year, we reviewed various protocols for evaluating vac-
cines, including influenza, that were conducted in the vac-
cine evaluation units then supported by NIAID. We were
kept abreast of the efforts to match the influenza virus
strains incorporated into the vaccines with the anticipated
wild strains that would circulate in the coming season.
In the first months of 1976, mere weeks after I had
become director of NIAID, influenza broke out at Fort
Dix, New Jersey. Several soldiers died, and soon the
Center for Disease Control (CDC) and other agencies
determined that the cause was a swine flu virus (H1N1),
thought to be a direct descendant of the virus that caused
the pandemic of 1918. This conclusion was based on anti-
bodies to H1N1 antigens found in survivors of the 1918
pandemic, and the belief that the 1918 virus was eventual-
ly transmitted to pigs in the Midwest, where it persisted
and caused sporadic human cases. Had the virus broken
out of the pigsty, so to speak, and caused the outbreak in
humans at Fort Dix?
Approximately 200 young men were infected in
January and February, as detected by conversion of serial
sera from negative to positive for swine flu hemagglu-
tinins. This finding was reported by Frank Top to the
AFEB. With the exception of 1 or 2 deaths, the disease was
reported to be mild.
Sometime in February 1976 a group of intramural and
extramural influenza experts reached a near consensus that
the Fort Dix swine flu was likely to be the source of an
imminent pandemic of influenza, perhaps similar to the
pandemic of 1918, because Fort Dix virus had the anti-
genic characteristics of what was thought to be the 1918
virus. One notable exception to this consensus thought it
possible but unlikely that the Fort Dix outbreak would be
the origin of a pandemic. He noted that an influenza epi-
demic began like a cloudburst in the population in which it
first makes its appearance, for example, in a cluster of
schoolchildren, as was the case with Asian flu in 1958.
Predictably, meetings of the experts were called, and a
general sense of alarm prevailed, as well as a sense that
something must be done to prevent an epidemic that might
be a replay of 1918. All agreed that we needed to enhance
national and worldwide surveillance to determine the
extent of a possible major outbreak of this virus, but other
courses of action were more hotly debated. Flu vaccines
became available in 1944, and the primary question facing
us was whether we should quickly prepare a vaccine with
the Fort Dix swine flu virus strain and immunize as much
of the population as possible.
In January, and for the next 10 months, David Sencer,
director of CDC, frequently consulted with Harry Meyer,
director of the Bureau of Biologics, and myself. Also
involved in the discussions were Theodore Cooper, assis-
tant secretary for the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare; Hope Hopps, Bureau of Biologics; Walter
Dowdle, chief of the virology section at CDC; and John
Seal, deputy director of NIAID. William Jordan and John
LaMontagne later joined the NIAID circle. Maurice
Hilleman of Merck frequently joined an informal group for
intense discussions on clinical trials that were conducted in
the spring of 1976 with the vaccines that had been quickly
prepared by the industry. 
Throughout the spring and summer, we monitored care-
fully for swine flu elsewhere in the world, particularly in
the Southern Hemisphere, where it was winter. We
received only scattered reports of an occasional case of
swine flu in farmers in the Midwest, and controversy raged
as to what the next steps should be. Should the vaccine be
stockpiled? The argument against stockpiling was strong:
the vaccine had to be given before the potential epidemic
occurred in September and October, and we were racing
against time. Initially, Albert Sabin insisted the vaccine
should be given to children when school began in
September 1976. Yet some experts preferred a “wait and
see” approach.
After much consultation and discussion at the highest
levels of the US government, the Public Health Service
launched a program to immunize 50 million people.
Following the largest voluntary mass vaccination cam-
paign since the mass vaccination programs with Salk and
Sabin polio vaccines, nearly 25% of the US population, or
45 million persons, were vaccinated by October, 10 short
months after the alarm was sounded.
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outbreak was a false alarm, and the American public and
much of the scientific community accused us of overreact-
ing. As someone noted, 1976 was the first time we had
been blamed for an epidemic that did not take place.
Donald Burke and his group at the Johns Hopkins
School of Public Health have recently calculated the basic
reproductive rate (R0) of the 1976 virus. On the basis of
available historical data, they calculate an R0 of 1.1–1.2.
This number suggests that swine flu would not have
become a major epidemic. We did not have those calcula-
tions at the time, nor were such calculations widely used.
At least R0 was >1 and not <1.
These efforts to prevent an epidemic were, in some
ways, like a big “fire drill.” We proved it was possible to
organize a mass influenza immunization program from
start to finish: identify the virus, grow up stocks, prepare
and field test the vaccine, provide for indemnity, and
immunize a large segment of the population, all within 10
months. We learned a great deal from that drill, and I am
sure we can do better the next time. The day will come
when we will again retrace this race against time.
The Fog of Epidemics
The uncertainty that surrounds any response to a micro-
bial outbreak, the “fog of epidemics,” is analogous to the
fog of war, of which historians speak (2).
The Fog of War: Uncertainty
Where is the enemy?
What is his strength?
What counterattack?
The Fog of Epidemics: Uncertainty
Where is the microbe?
How many; how virulent; how communicable?
What counterattack?
Perceived Miscalculations
1975 Swine flu outbreak
Response too rapid
1981 HIV/AIDS occurrence
Response too slow1
In the case of swine flu, we may have acted too soon.
And in the case of AIDS, we may have acted too slowly.
Read the book by Neustadt and Fineberg (3) for a full
account of our perceived folly in regard to swine flu. For
an account of the perception that from 1981 to 1984, as
director of NIAID, I dithered over the onset of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic, read what Shilts says about me in
And the Band Played On (4).
I relate these personal reminiscences because many
who read this article will be on the firing line when future
epidemics threaten, and they may either erupt or fizzle out.
You will be in a fog, and you will need to exercise the best
judgment you can on the basis of available surveillance
information and historical context. Roy Anderson and oth-
ers have been on the firing line in the United Kingdom
with bovine spongiform encephalopathy and foot-and-
mouth disease. And now any number of national and inter-
national organizations and the ministries of health in many
countries in Southeast Asia are on the firing line in regard
to avian influenza. Should we stockpile drugs? Prepare a
vaccine? Cull infected flocks? When difficult choices
arise, criticism is almost certain to follow, but as Harry
Truman said, “If you can’t stand the heat, stay out of the
kitchen.”
Original Antigenic Sin
Any narrative on the swine flu episode would be
incomplete without mentioning the work of Richard Shope
on the possible relationship between the putative influenza
virus of 1918 and its eventful residence in pigs in Iowa,
where it caused an influenzalike syndrome and where it
remained as a reservoir (5). Whatever the merits of this
argument about the cause of swine flu virus infection in
adults in the 1930s, of interest here is Francis’s suggestion
that the swine flu antibody in humans was the result of
repeated exposure to human strains, and perhaps not due to
prior infection with the 1918 virus. Surely his thoughts
about this matter were the genesis of the concepts
expressed in On the Doctrine of Original Antigenic Sin,
published in 1960 (6).
Francis wrote, “The antibody of childhood is largely a
response to dominant antigen of the virus causing the first
type A influenza infection of the lifetime. The antibody-
forming mechanisms are highly conditioned by the first
stimulus, so that later infections with strains of the same
type successfully enhance the original antibody to main-
tain it at the highest level at all times in that age group. The
imprint established by the original virus infection governs
the antibody response thereafter. This we have called the
Doctrine of the Original Antigenic Sin.”
Francis died in 1969 and did not live to know the full
explanations for antigenic shift through reassortment of
gene segments from 2 parent viruses or antigenic drift
through mutation. He surely would have been in awe, as
we all are, of the molecular explanation of influenza virus
variation with succeeding epidemics. And yet, even with
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Elsevier.the brilliant work of Taubenberger delineating the 1918
virus (7), we can still ask Francis’s question: Which strain
will cause the next pandemic? Francis would have been
cautious, but he certainly would have agreed that knowing
the genetics of the 1918 virus will guide our strategy to
confront future influenza pandemics. And I believe he
would be cautious about the pandemic potential of the cur-
rent avian influenza virus. He would warn us to keep alert
to the unexpected, to be prepared for a “newe acquayan-
tance.”
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